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VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND CERTIFICATION –
EXPERIENCES FROM AMERICA
Incorporation of “Private” Environmental Certification Systems in
Formal Legal Systems: the U.S. Case*
Errol E. Meidinger∗∗
1 Introduction
More and more industrial organizations are willingly committing to meet heightened environmental
standards through private environmental certification programs. Such programs generally claim to
harness the incentives of the market to promote the
public interest.1 The programs typically define the
environmental standards that firms must meet and
establish organizational mechanisms for achieving
and “certifying” compliance. Well known examples
include the chemical industry’s “Responsible Care”
program,2 the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 14000 environmental management program,3 and the Forest Stewardship Council’s well-managed forests program.4
*©

Errol E. Meidinger, 2000. This is a revision of a paper presented to the
CAVA workshop on “The Integration of Voluntary Approaches into Existing
Legal Systems,” held in Brussels, February 24-25, 2000. Helpful comments by workshop participants, and by Guyora Binder, Chris Elliott, and
students in my University of Freiburg Forest Certification seminar are
gratefully acknowledged, as is the research assistance of Patrick Omilian.
Also much appreciated was the supportive work environment of the Institute for Forest Economics at the University of Freiburg, where the paper
was completed.
**
Professor and Vice Dean of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo,
NY 14260-1100, .
Fulbright Senior Scholar, Institute for Forest Economics, University of
Freiburg, 1999-2000. Email: eemeid@buffalo.edu;
Web: http://www.ublaw.buffalo.edu/fas/meidinger.
1 E.g., Errol Meidinger, Look Who’s Making the Rules: the Roles of the FSC
and ISO in International Environmental Policy. 4 HUM. ECOL. REV. 52
(1997).
2 The
American Responsible Care Program is described at
http://www.cmahq.com. The Canadian program (the first in the world) is at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00797e.html. For a general overview see,
Neil Gunningham, Environment, Self-Regulation, and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsible Care, 17 L. & POL. 57-109 (1995)
3 See ISO Website: http://www.iso.ch/9000e/isoanden.htm. For a general
overview, see e.g., Steven Bass, Introducing Forest Certification, Report
of the International Institute for Environment and Development (1997)
http://www.efi.fi/publications/Discussion_Papers/01.pdf or Errol Meidinger,
‘Private’ Environmental Regulation, Human Rights, and Community, 6
BUFF. ENV. L. J. 132 (1999) (hereafter Meidinger, Private Environmental
Regulation) http://www.ublaw.buffalo.edu/fas/meidinger/hrec.pdf
4 See FSC Website: http://www.fscoax.org/principal.htm. For general
overviews, see again Bass or Meidinger, supra note 3. There are numerous other private environmental certification programs. Many of the older
ones concentrate on food labeling, particularly in Europe. Many of the
newer ones focus on particular sectors of environmental management,
such as forestry, fishing, chemical production, and so on.

With their standard setting, adjudication, and implementation mechanisms, certification programs
bear an interesting resemblance to government
regulatory programs. Yet, because of their apparently autonomous and voluntary nature, these “unilateral commitment” programs5 are often conceptualized as separate and distinct from legal systems. It
appears, however, that certification systems are
deeply intertwined with law. Not only do they use
legal mechanisms to organize themselves and control their members, they also cite the possibility of
intensified legal regulation to attract members.
Perhaps more importantly, they can have a significant influence on governmental policies, and on the
content and implementation of legal rules. Given
the common focus of certification and legal systems
on policy-making and control, it seems obvious that
they will intersect and interact in various ways.
The goal of this paper is to describe the main ways
in which environmental certification systems are
likely to interact with the U.S. legal system. Although certification systems depend on legal systems to organize themselves, and may also increase
the institutionalization of law in private organizations in important ways, this paper focuses primarily on how legal systems use, are influenced by, and
respond to certification systems.6 Its working hypothesis is that environmental certification systems
will have a substantial influence on the substance
and operation of the U.S. legal system over time. Its
primary goal is to describe the avenues through
5

6

This categorization reflects the work of the Concerted Action on Voluntary
Approaches (CAVA) project, an EU-supported effort to develop a research
network and a body of research on the use of “voluntary approaches” to
improved environmental management.
http://www.ensmp.fr/Fr/CERNA/CERNA/Progeuropeens/CAVA/index.html
See, Steven Baeke, Marc DeClercq, and Erik Matthijs, The Nature of
Voluntary Approaches: Empirical Evidence and Patterns: Literature Survey, CAVA Working Paper no 99/08/3, August 1999; Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, VOLUNTARY APPROACHES
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: AN ASSESSMENT (1999). Certification systems are a special kind of unilateral commitment program, since
they do not claim to be “one shot” efforts, but rather set up frameworks for
long-term policy development and implementation.
The use of law by certification organizations is the topic of a planned
subsequent paper.
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which certification systems are likely to shape the
legal system. Because of the potentially high degree
of legal influence by certification, legal systems are
also likely to try to constrain or shape certification
systems. So the paper also describes the primary
means through which this may happen.
It is too early in the development of private environmental certification systems to offer either an
assessment of their overall societal importance or a
strong theory explaining their emergence and expansion.7 Their normative implications must also be
left to other papers.8 Before reviewing the ways in
which certification systems can be incorporated into
law, however, it is helpful to give some definition to
the key terms: “legal system” and “certification
system.”

a Legal Systems
Of course, the definitions of “law” and “legal system” have been much disputed over the years, and
will not be resolved here. For present purposes it is
sufficient to note that there is widespread acceptance that legal systems have the following features:9
(1) Legislative bodies, often representing defined
interests, make rules governing actors within
their jurisdiction.
(2) Adjudicative bodies determine the applicability
of rules in particular cases. In doing so they often give further definition to rules.
(3) Enforcement bodies
(a) gather information on compliance with
rules, and
(b) use sanctions (punishments and rewards), to
promote compliance.
(4) The legal bodies operate under rules, ordinarily governing both their composition and procedures. The latter often include public participation requirements.
(5) Actions taken by legal bodies are not fully determined by rules. They also involve the exercise of judgment and discretion.10
7
8
9

10

For a preliminary effort, see Meidinger, supra note 3.
See id.
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980).
Although I am using western legal terms here, such as legislation and
adjudication, these terms need not be used by legal systems. The key
idea is that they have ways of formulating rules, determining their applicability, applying sanctions, and so on.
The amount of discretion, however, may often look larger when viewed
from the perspective of rules than when viewed within a social context
including cultural assumptions, shared operating procedures, and the like.
E.g., Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline. 9 L. &
POL., 355-386 (1987); Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents
1997, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1299 (1997).
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(6) Sovereign states provide the primary authority
and implementation mechanisms.
The last criterion is asserted by many,11 but not all12
legal theorists. It has long faced problems regarding
how democratic a state must be for its rules to
qualify as law. More recently, the growth of a
global order transcending individual states yet enacting rules that operate like laws has created problems for this conception.13 These issues receive
further attention in the conclusion of this paper.

b) Certification Systems
Although there is no uniform definition of a certification system, and existing programs that are classified as certification systems vary greatly, most
definitions include the following elements:
(1) Standard setting bodies operating with defined
membership and decision processes. These can
be either industry groups, as in the Responsible
Care Program, or broader sets of stakeholders,
as in the Forest Stewardship Council.14
(2) Standards for certification,
(a) These tend to follow either or both of two
general approaches:
(i) Substantive performance standards (the
FSC approach);15
(ii) Environmental management system
standards (the ISO approach)16, stressing
1. enterprise-based policy making;
2. detailed organizational arrangements
for planning, information gathering,
monitoring, compliance assessment,
and plan revision; and
3. continuous improvement in either
a. the management system, or
b. environmental performance.17

12

13

14

15

16

E.g., Hans Kelsen, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE
(1945). Kelsen, like most western legal theorists of the late 19th and 20th
centuries, argued that law must involve a threat of punishment by the
state.
E.g., Friedrich Charles von Savigny, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE
FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (Arno Press 1975) (Abraham Hayward trans., London 1831). Savigny argued that law "is first developed by custom...next by jurisprudence -- everywhere, therefore, by
internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a law-giver."
Id at 30. He was arguing against the creation of a national law for Germany, and in favor of preserving local variation.
E.g., Guenther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal
and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. LAW. 149 (1997).
The scope of certification programs varies. They can be global, regional,
national, or even sub-national, though subnational and national programs
are likely to be viable only in the narrowest markets.
See Appendix A for the primary FSC management principles, and examples of criteria applying them.
See Appendix B for the primary ISO environmental management system
standard.
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(b) Certification can attach to an enterprise, a
product, or both.
(3) Organizational mechanisms for certifying compliance of individual firms with applicable standards, which generally:
(a) rely heavily on professional expertise,
(b) focus on information production and management,
(c) struggle over the relative independence of
the certification body from the firm.18
(4) Provisions for public participation19
(5) Mechanisms for sanctioning non-compliance,
usually:
(a) withdrawal of certification, and/or
(b) expulsion from an industry group.20
Thus, many environmental certification systems
have most of the basic organizational elements of
legal systems. The Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC), for example, has a constitutional structure
establishing an international “general assembly”
representing economic, environmental, and social
interests in equal proportions, and giving northern
(developed) and southern (developing) societies
equal voting power within each interest.21 It also
provides for national and regional legislative bodies
to define place-based forest management standards
and criteria, which become applicable upon approval by the General Assembly. The central and
regional legislative bodies have promulgated a large
number of rules governing forest management, its
evaluation, and certification, which closely resemble what legal scholars ordinarily call legislation.22
17

18

19

20

21

22

Whether improvements in the system are acceptable, or whether improvements in outcome measures should be required is a major source of
in the debate about certification systems. See e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza,
Private Voluntary Standard-Setting, the International Organization for
Standardization, and International Environmental Lawmaking, in Günther
Handl, 6 YEARRBOOK OF INTL ENVTL LAW 107 (1995); Joel Ticknor,
ISO 14,000: Will it Deter Cleaner Production, 8 NEW SOLUTIONS 285,
286 (1998); Pierre Hauselmann, ISO Inside Out: ISO and Environmental
Management, WWF International Discussion Paper (1997).
Many voluntary codes and certification programs started with selfcertification by the firm, then moved to trade association certification, and
now seem to be moving to third party certification. There is a growing
understanding in the field that unless programs are monitored by credible
third parties (sometimes environmental NGOs, sometimes organizations
vetted by them), they are unlikely to be seen as credible.
Public participation provisions vary considerably among programs, and
often seem designed to limit rather than expand the public role in standard
setting and certification. See Meidinger, Private Environmental Regulation,
supra note3.
There is no systematic information on how often certification systems
actually employ sanctions. My impression from communicating with
knowledgeable sources is that sanctions have rarely been imposed to
date.
For a thorough description of the FSC structure, see Meidinger, Private
Environmental Regulation, supra note 3.
For examples, see Appendix A. Note that much but not all of the legislation is applicable to forestry management. Much of it also defines how the

Much like a government agency, the FSC also has
standards and procedures for accrediting the certifiers who determine whether forest management units
meet FSC management standards. The certifiers act
as both adjudicators and enforcers of standards.
First they are charged with determining whether
applicants for certification meet the various ecological, operational, economic, and social criteria.
Second, they are charged with monitoring firms that
receive certification and can revoke certificates if
forest management falls below set standards. As in
many regulatory regimes, considerable responsibility for collecting information and reporting on compliance falls to regulated firms.
FSC certifiers exercise a great deal of discretion and
judgment in determining whether individual forest
management operations meet the standards for
certification. This is due to both the inherent complexity of forest management and the multiple environmental, social, and economic goals of the certification regime. Although substantive and organizational details vary, other environmental certification
systems, including those of the International Organization for Standardization and the Chemical
Manufacturers Association, established primarily by
industry,23 show similar organizational patterns.24
The institutional characteristic typical of a legal
system that the FSC and most other private environmental certification systems lack is a command
from a sovereign directing all management organizations in a given category to achieve certification
standards, and subjecting them to sovereignimposed penalties for failure to do so. As indicated
above, certification systems are generally characterized as “voluntary.” Firms subscribe to them
because they determine that it is in their interest to
do so. Yet it is increasingly common to describe
environmental certification as a “de facto require-

23

24

various bodies in the FSC system are to operate, as would be the case
with traditional legislation. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989).
I do not use the term “self regulation” here, for two reasons. The most
obvious is that some systems, such as those of the Forest Stewardship
Council and the Marine Stewardship Council, have been established primarily by environmental NGOs, and not by industry. Secondly, the term
“self” can obscure the organizational dynamics of regulation, since there
are complex and distinct interests within many industry based regulatory
programs. Nonetheless, the work of scholars who have studied selfregulation is fundamental to this research. E.g., Ian Ayres and John
Braithwaite, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Peter N. Grabosky, Green Markets:
Environmental Regulation by the Private Sector, 16 L. & POL. 419-48
(1994).
See generally Meidinger, Private Environmental Regulation, supra note 3;
Gunningham supra note 2. The primary institutional differences at this
time have to do with how broad partcipation is in the standard setting
process and the degree of independence and professionalism necessary
to make verification of compliance credible.
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ment” for doing business in many jurisdictions.25
When interviewed, corporate officials often state
that they feel they have “no real choice” but to
become environmentally certified. The reasons they
give vary, and include such factors as avoiding
intensified government regulation, maintaining or
expanding market share, averting negative publicity, improving community and/or employee relations, improving organizational efficiency, meeting
demands of up-stream sellers or down-stream buyers,26 obtaining higher prices, avoiding legal liability, increasing shareholder confidence, and so on.
Although many of these reasons do not flow directly from state regulation, they do suggest a context in which industrial enterprises view environmental certification as a mandatory condition of
operating in modern society.
Thus, the gap between coercive state regulation and
“voluntary” private certification is not as wide as
one might expect. Moreover, many of the reasons
given to explain the growth of certification have at
different times in history been grounds for expanded government regulation. It is not surprising,
therefore, that complex relationships might emerge
between certification and legal systems.
The next two sections catalog some of the legal
channels through which those relationships can
operate. Section 2 lists legal mechanisms that seem
largely receptive to certification systems, while
Section 3 lists ones that seem resistant. It is important to note, however, that most of the legal mechanisms described below could in principle be used
either to promote or to undermine certification
programs. State environmental regulatory agencies,
for example, could prohibit certification of firms or
otherwise punish certified firms. The primary reason that they do not appear likely to do so is that
certification programs claim to build upon state
regulatory programs. Participating firms claim to be
going “beyond compliance,” and it would be very
difficult for agencies to rationalize prohibiting firms
from doing so, or punishing them for it. Nonetheless, it is possible to interpret rules as “ceilings” and
not just as “floors,” and regulatory folklore has it
that officials and industry groups sometimes punish
firms informally for going above ceilings.
25

26

E.g., Virginia Haufler, “Private Sector International Regimes, 4 POLIBUS 2
(1998); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 17 at 119; Ticknor, supra note 17 at 286.
Ford Motor Company, for example, recently announced that it will require
all of its suppliers to have at least one manufacturing site ISO 14001 certiified by the of 2001. General Motors Corporation is requiring to meet the
ISO 14001 standard, but not necessarily to be registered, by the end of
2002. Amy Zuckerman, Ford, GM set ISO 14000 Requirements, NEW
STEEL, Mar. 1, 2000 at 58.
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2 Legal Incorporation of Certification Systems
Private environmental certification systems can be
incorporated in formal legal systems in many possible ways. The list that follows is preliminary, and is
intended to characterize the problem with sufficient
precision to allow further inquiry. As will be discussed in Section 4, the list is largely limited to
“legal” mechanisms as they are conceived in traditional legal scholarship. Other important micro and
macro dimensions of incorporation should also be
considered.

a) Legal requirement of certification
The most obvious means of incorporating certification into a legal system would be for an authoritative legal body to require that firms operating
within its jurisdiction be certified. That legal body
could be either a legislature, or an administrative
agency with a broad mandate to achieve environmental improvement. There is much to commend
this strategy, since it can mandate global, state-ofthe-art standards, place much of the administrative
burden on non-state bureaucracies funded by the
enterprises involved, and garner some of the political legitimacy of environmental NGOs for the state
regulatory system. Its downsides include a reduction in state control over regulatory policy (although
the state retains the option of imposing and administering its own standards) and potentially higher
costs of operation for enterprises than if state agencies bore the costs of administration.27 To date there
are only a few examples of states requiring environmental certification: the Brazilian state of Acre
recently made FSC certification a requirement of
practicing forestry in the state28 and Zimbabwe has
incorporated ISO 14001 into its regulatory system.29
Yet it seems likely that their numbers will grow as
the certification systems mature and become better
known.
Administrative agencies also have the capacity to
require certification. They would most likely use
27

28

29

Of course there are contending normative arguments regarding who
should bear administrative costs. One position is that the public should
bear them, since the certification program promotes the public interest in
an improved environment. The other is that the enterprise should bear
them, ordinarily through increased costs to its consumers, since it creates
the situation requiring the regulatory program. This is the so-called “polluter pays” principle. The position one takes on these questions depends
on the entitlement structure from which one begins the analysis.
Personal communications, Professor Dr. Michel Becker, Institute for
Forest Policy, University of Freiburg and Dr. Dietrich Burger, Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Organization for
Technical Cooperation), Frankfurt.
Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Standards
Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation? 37 AM. BUS. L.J.
237, 276 (2000). Whether these examples are evidence that developing
countries are especially likely to adopt private environmental certification
requirements in their regulatory systems can only be known over time.
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rules, in conjunction with contracts, as mechanisms
for doing so. A rule, for example, could simply
require firms operating in the jurisdiction to be
certified by a specific program, or by one of several
eligible programs. Contracts could then be used by
the agency to achieve a degree of control over the
certification programs without going through more
cumbersome rulemaking or adjudication procedures. While these methods are being used in some
other areas of privatization, such as prisons and
healthcare,30 their extension to environmental
regulation would probably be a new development. It
should be noted, however, that the U.S. environmental laws already give a large role to private
enforcers through “citizen suit” provisions, which
allow interested parties to bring enforcement actions for violations of federal or state pollution
control standards.31
In the U.S. legal system a law requiring private
certification would probably face legal challenges
based on the “non-delegation doctrine,” which is
generally held to prohibit the delegation of law
making powers to private actors.32 There is a simple
solution, however, which is for the legislature to
review the standards involved and to enact them as
its own if it so chooses. It may even suffice for the
legislature to reserve the power to review the private rules and to provide for judicial review of them
under general administrative law.33 In the case of
administrative agencies, which have convened a
number of negotiated rulemaking (“reg-neg”) committees of stakeholders to negotiate draft rules in
recent years, it is sufficient that the agency convene
a “balanced” committee, review the rule developed
by the committee, and subject it to normal agency
decisional procedures.34

If state or federal governmental bodies in the U.S.
were to mandate certification, questions regarding
the applicability of anti-trust law and administrative
law would also arise. While they are too involved to
discuss fully here, they could likely be managed.
U.S. anti-trust law has a general exception for anticompetitive conditions resulting from intentional
state action.35 Thus anti-trust questions could be
handled by clear, legislatively authorized policies
combined with state supervision of the certification
program.36
The administrative law issues would divide among
statutory and constitutional questions. The main
constitutional question would be whether the Due
Process clause applies to certification processes.
The Supreme Court has tended to narrow the definition of “state action” to which the clause applies
in recent years.37 But it is not entirely clear that the
rulemaking and adjudication involved in standard
setting and certification processes would be exempt.
Thus, it is at least conceivable that certifiers would
have to meet due process standards if certification
were state mandated. That might not be particularly
difficult, however, since Due Process requirements
generally are not stringent, and since many nominally private organizations have already incorporated comparable procedures.38 In the statutory
realm, it seems likely that, on their own terms, statutes such as the federal Administrative Procedure
Act and similar state acts would not be held to apply to certification processes. Nothing, however,
would preclude legislatures from making them
applicable, and it seems likely that if states chose to

35
30

31

32

33

34

See generally, Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 543 (2000); Laurent Hourcle and Frederick J. Lees, Applicability of ISO 14000 Standards to Government Contracts, 27 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10071 (1997).
See generally, Barry Boyer and Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory
Enforcement: A Preliminary Analysis of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 834-965 (1985). Government agencies can exercise control over such actions either by taking over prosecution of the case or by intervening in the private enforcement action. If the
government does take over prosecution of the case, the private litigant
retains the right to continue participating as an intervenor. Id.
The key decision was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
which invalidated a New Deal statute allowing bituminous coal producers
to elect boards to set minimum prices for coal in their districts. The court
stressed the possible conflicts of interests of business representatives
regulating others in their industry. For a sophisticated contemporary
analysis, see Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal
Government, 85 Nw. U.L. REV. 62 (1990)
This is what the states often have done when privatizing prison administration. Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison
Privatization, 35 UCLA L. REV. 911 (1988).
As authorized by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 101 P.L. 648;
104 Stat. 4969. The statute requires the agency to exercise somewhat

36

37

38

more control over the reg-neg process than described in the text, but this
is not a constitutional requirement.
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (upholding a California statute fixing
the price of raisins).
California Retail Liquor Dealer’s Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. at 97 (1980) (defining the clear statement and state supervision criteria). Absent such active state involvement, however, firms participating in
self-regulatory standard setting do face risks of anti-trust liability. See,
e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492
(1988) (holding the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), a nongovernmental standard setting organization, liable for anti-trust violations,
when steel manufacturers used its processes to prevent approval of plastic conduit as an alternative to steel in the NFPA’s National Electrical
Code, which was subsequently adopted by many governmental bodies).
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 30.; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization and
the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act: Furthering Democracy and the
Global Public Interest, Bloomington Snyder Lecture, Lauterpacht Center
for International Research, University of Cambridge, February 3, 1999.
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=176691 Copy on file with
author.
See generally, Lauren Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational
Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace,
95 AM. J. of SOC. 1401 (1990). There are complex problems in standard
setting organizations, however, some of which do not provide the equivalent of notice and comment rulemaking, or do limit participation those with
direct, material interests. See generally John P. Shoaf, “Business as
Usual or an Instance of Reinvention and Privatization in Environmental
Rulemaking? New Rules and Issues with the Use of Voluntary Consensus
Standards,” May 25, 1999, at 31. Copy on file with author..
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require regulated industries to achieve certification
they could eventually be persuaded to subject certification systems to administrative law-like procedural requirements.39

b) Official promotion of certification
Rather than “sticks,” governments can use “carrots”
to promote preferred policies. Given their ability to
avert legal and political challenges based on delegation of lawmaking powers while still altering
environmental practices, government-provided
incentives could turn out to be the preferred policy
instrument for promoting certification. Several large
U.S. administrative agencies either are considering
or have made ISO 14001 certification one of their
purchasing criteria.40 The EPA has promulgated a
number of policies that explicitly or implicitly promote certification. Its enforcement policies, for
example, while not directed solely at certification
systems, indicate that environmental certification
will be viewed as a positive factor in reviewing
organizational compliance records.41 EPA’s Office
of Compliance Assurance and Monitoring is integrating environmental management system elements into its enforcement protocols and settlement
criteria.42 The agency has also used ISO 14001 in
several of its Project XL multimedia permitting
processes.43 EPA has published several documents
and handbooks assisting and promoting development of ISO 14000-style management systems for
both industry and for local governments,44 and has
supported research in support of the further deployment of environmental management systems.45
The Federal Sentencing Commission has also provided that criminal defendants with “environmental
39
40

41

42

43

44

45

See Section 3 infra.
The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy require ISO
14001 certification for first and second-level suppliers. (Second level suppliers are those who provide supplies to firms which actually supply products to the agencies.) Stenzel, supra note 29 at 270.
USEPA, Audit Policy: Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Federal Register
66706 (December 22, 1995) ("Where violations are found through voluntary environmental audits or efforts that reflect a regulated entity's due
diligence, and are promptly disclosed and expeditiously corrected, EPA
will not seek gravity-based (i.e., noneconomic benefit) penalties and will
generally not recommend criminal prosecution against the regulated entity.").
USEPA Draft EMS Action Plan for Public Comment, December 20, 1999
http://www.epa.gov/ems/plan99.htm
The most recent is with Imation Enterprises Corporation, the world’s
largest manufacturer of magnetic data storage tapes. Id at 15.
E.g., EPA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, Enviromental Management Systems. http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/dfe/tools/ems/ems.html ;
EPA Office of Wastewater Management, Environmental Management
Systems: An Implementation Guide for Small and Medium-Sized Organizations, http://www.epa.gov/owmitnet/wm046200.htm
E.g., Position Statement on Environmental Management Systems and
ISO 14001 and a Request for Comments on the Nature of the Data To Be
Collected From Environmental Management System/ISO 14001 Pilots, 63
Federal Register 12094-12097 (March 12, 1998)
http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-GENERAL/1998/March/Day12/g6389.htm
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compliance programs,” which many certification
programs would probably qualify as, can have their
sentences significantly reduced.46 Even the Overseas Private Investment Corporation has published
draft guidance indicating that an ISO 1400 management system will help project sponsors demonstrate environmental monitoring and management
capacity meeting its requirements for support.47
One of the most direct efforts to promote certification occurred recently at the state level, when Connecticut passed an “Act Concerning Exemplary
Environmental Management Systems.” The Act
provides special benefits to companies that have:
(1) registered ISO 14001 environmental management systems, (2) adopted approved principles of
sustainability, and (3) good compliance records.
The benefits include: (1) expedited permit review,
(2) reduced fees, (3) less frequent reporting, (4)
facility wide permits for approved firms, and (5)
public recognition of having attained this achievement.48 While it is difficult to track developments
like this, other states might well adopt similar legislation. Whether they do or not, it is important to
remember that favorable treatment of certified firms
is only part of the government enforcement package
that will best promote certification. The other part is
effective enforcement of the environmental laws,
which minimizes the relative economic disadvantages of certification for firms.
Government agencies can also promote the expansion of private certification programs by subjecting
themselves to them. A number of state and local
agencies responsible for managing public forests
have had their forests certified. Some have chosen
the more environmentally and socially demanding
FSC program,49 others the somewhat less protective
American Forest and Paper Association program.50
46

47

48

49

50

See Tom Tibor & Ira Feldman, ISO 14000: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 226 (1995); see also
Organization Sentencing Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,762, § 8A1.2,
Comment K (U.S. Sentencing Comm. 1991); Draft Corporate Guidelines
for Environmental Violations, §§ 9C1.2, 9D1.1 (U.S. Sentencing Comm.
1993).
United States International Development Cooperation Agency (ICDA),
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Request for Comments
on Draft Environmental Handbook; Notice, 63 FR 9696 (1998).
Connecticut State Statutes.
http://www.cga.state.ct.us/ps99/Act/pa/1999PA-00226-R00HB-06830PA.htm. This provision, like much of the other information in this article,
came to my attention through the “voluntary codes” list-serve maintained
by Kernaghan Webb. This is an invaluable source of information, and can
be accessed at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00973e.html .
Thus far, the agencies responsible for managing state-owned lands in
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and New York have either achieved FSC certification or announced that they intend to do so. Margaret Higgins, New
York forests get green thumbs-up, Environmental News Network, February 5, 2000,
http://www.enn.com/enn-newsarchive/2000/02/02052000/certification_9680.asp
E.g., Itaska and Lake County Minnesota.
http://www.afandpa.org/forestry/sfi/sfi_license.html
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The federal land management agencies appear to
have no near term intention of seeking third party
certification of their lands.51 The EPA, by contrast,
has put a considerable effort into promoting the use
of ISO-style environmental management systems at
all levels of government, including its own operations and those of other agencies.52

c) Express adoption of the same or substantially
similar standards
As noted above, independent enactment of certification standards would be one way of avoiding
delegation doctrine problems. Because the states
and the federal government share authority over
environmental protection, adoption of certification
standards could occur at either level. Moreover, it
could be done either by legislatures, or by administrative agencies with broad substantive and procedural mandates. At the legislative level, no evidence
of formal adoption of environmental certification
standards has come to light during the preparation
of this paper.53 In the past, moreover, many other
types of privately generated standards have been
adopted by North American legislatures.54 Given
the inherent attractiveness of ready-made standards,
environmental certification system standards seem
likely to become increasingly important in federal
and state legislative processes over time. As that
happens, legislatures will doubtless be tempted to
change private standards to reflect their particular
concerns, as they have done with model legislation
in other areas such as criminal and product liability
law.55 On the other hand, pressure for interjurisdictional consistency in standards is growing,
and privately generated international environmental
standards could prove quite robust.56
51

52

53

54

55

56

Forest Stewardship Council United States, Federal Lands Policy Statement Concerning FSC-Endorsed Certification on U.S. Federal Lands.
http://www.fscus.org/current_issues/federallands.html
See generally, USEPA Draft EMS Action Plan for Public Comment,
December 20, 1999 http://www.epa.gov/ems/plan99.htm; USEPA, Code
of Environmental Management Principles for Federal Agencies, 61 Federal Register 54061-54066 (October 16, 1996).
However, Bolivia recently adopted forestry standards virtually identical to
the FSC standards. Personal Communication, Dr. Dietrich Burger, Forestry Program, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
(German Organization for Technical Cooperation), Eschborn.
See generally, Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental
Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting
Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329-1484 (1978). State and local
legislatures have also adopted uncounted private codes in such areas as
plumbing, construction, accounting practices, and the like. Id.
Examples include the Model Penal Code, the Uniform Commercial Code,
Restatements of Torts and Contracts, and the like.
The question of how much demand there is for inter-jurisdictional consistency is in fact quite complex. While some industrial interests operating in
multiple legal jurisdictions have powerful interests in uniform standards,
others, either operating in a narrower set of jurisdictions or having more
capacity to vary performance according to locale, have equally strong
interests in differential standards, which they have a comparative advantages in meeting.

At the administrative level, U.S. agencies have a
long history of incorporating privately generated
standards in public regulations. Sometimes the
private standards are small elements of rules covering larger topics, as in a Federal Trade Commission rule incorporating the American Society for
Testing and Materials’ standard for measuring
gasoline octane in a rule requiring sellers to post
octane ratings on their pumps.57 Other times agency
rules are aimed at essentially the same issues as the
private standards. When the Occupational Safety
and Health Administrative began operations in
1971, for example, it quickly converted a whole raft
of private health and safety standards into regulatory requirements.58 Other agencies have done the
same.59 It is clear that EPA has often drawn upon
private standards in setting regulatory requirements,
but there appear to be no published studies providing a comprehensive overview of how it has done
this. In addition, National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) requires that
federal agencies “use technical standards that are
developed or adopted by voluntary consensus bodies” and participate in their development where
possible. 60 The exact reach of the statute remains
open to interpretation, particularly because it does
not define key terms such as “technical standard”
and “voluntary consensus body.”61 Nonetheless, it
seems likely to exert a steady pull that on agency
practice over time.
It is also important to note that some of the emerging private environmental standards might be difficult for agencies to incorporate, because they include areas beyond the jurisdiction of any single
57

58

59
60

61

See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Association v. Federal Trade
Commission, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The OSHA’s review of private standards was not always stellar, and it
sometimes mandated standards that were either poorly developed or
obsolete, such as a rule against ice in drinking water that derived from the
days when all ice was obtained from frozen lakes and rivers. On the other
hand, it also achieved considerable successes by using private standards.
See generally, Hamilton, supra note 54. Though over twenty years old,
this study remains one of the few serious pieces of research ever to have
been done on regulatory incorporation of privately set standards in the
U.S.
Id.
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §
3701 (1996). The statute requires agencies to utilize voluntary standards
unless doing so would be “inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical,”
and to report decisions not to use such standards to the Office of Management and Budget.
For a careful analysis of the statute and its possible effects on environmental regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency, see Shoaf,
supra note 38. It is also important to note that the Office of Management
and Budget has promulgated a revised version of Circular A-119, which
seeks to provide guidance to executive branch agencies on how to implement the Act. OMB Circular A-119, “Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity
Assessment Activities,” 63 Fed. Reg. 8545 (1998). Shoaf’s analysis explores an number of important ambiguities in the reach of the statute in
terms of what kinds of what kinds of standards and standard setting bodies are promoted by the statute.
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agency. The FSC standards, for example, include
indigenous rights, worker safety, and community
economic concerns, in addition to environmental
protection -- concerns well beyond the jurisdiction
of any single agency. Although some federal and
state administrative agencies have been trying to
achieve cross-agency policy coordination in recent
years, the going has been very difficult.62 This
could conceivably mean either that nongovernmental programs have a significant longterm structural advantage over governmental ones,
or that their efforts to integrate multiple concerns
are too far ahead of governmental programs to be
attractive to most industries.
Overall, the quality of legislative and administrative
deliberation in adopting private standards has varied
tremendously in different situations. Sometimes the
legal bodies have carefully reviewed, evaluated, and
appropriately amended, private standards, other
times they have not.63 When administrative agencies incorporate standards, they are subject to judicial review and must produce decisional records
sufficient to persuade reviewing courts that their
decisions were rational and based on adequate evidence.64 The NTTAA may make it somewhat easier
for agency rules incorporating private standards to
sustain judicial review, since it expresses a general
preference for such standards, and puts a special
burden on agencies to explain decisions in which
they choose not to use them.

d) Indirect adoption through “environmental” laws
Some of the most important and difficult-to-trace
forms of legal change unfold in informal processes.
These processes include broad discussions in industrial, professional, and policy circles,65 as well
specific transactions among firms, regulators,66 and
62

63

64

65

66

See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Organizational and Legal Challenges for
Ecosystem Management. In Kathryn A. Kohm and Jerry F. Franklin, eds.,
CREATING A FORESTRY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE SCIENCE
OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, Chapter 23 (1997).
Hamilton, supra note 54. It appears to be extremely common for state
legislatures to include private standards in legislation by reference, sometimes providing that changes in the standards will automatically be mandated by the legislation. Id.
Several Consumer Product Safety Commission rules based on preexistent standards, for example, failed the ‘substantial evidence’ test on
judicial review. Id at 1401. Absent statutory directives to the contrary,
agency rules are subject to the nominally less stringent “arbitrary and
capricious” standard under APA Section 706(2)(a), though there is disagreement among scholars about whether there is really any difference
between the two review standards.
An example is the growth of the field of “industrial ecology.” See, e.g.,
Robert U. and Leslie W. Ayers, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY: TOWARDS
CLOSING THE MATERIAL CYCLE (1996) and Thomas E. Graedel and
Braden R. Allenby, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY (1995).
See for example the negotiations described by Keith Hawkins,
ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE
SOCIAL DEFINITION OF POLLUTION (1984).
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sometimes community organizations.67 It seems
quite likely that the private environmental certification programs will affect regulatory programs
through these almost invisible channels, beyond
whatever changes are promulgated as official policy. Some of tacit changes are likely to occur as
inspectors evaluate practices at industrial facilities
and question whether firms are following best practices. Others may come into play when permits go
through revision cycles, and regulators or public
interest groups push for up-to-date standards.
Regulatory officials can also promote private standards in their choices of which firms to inspect and
monitor. Thus, they might decide to treat certification as an indicator of strong performance, and to
concentrate their enforcement efforts on other
firms.68 As it became apparent in an industry that
certified firms were likely to suffer fewer or less
intensive inspections, or to find it easier to get necessary regulatory approvals, the standard of practice
in the industry would likely converge with that of
the certification program.
In the Canadian legal system certification standards
may play an additional indirect role in shaping
environmental regulatory standards. Regulated
firms are subject to “strict liability.” To convict, the
government need simply show that a firm violated a
standard, and offer no evidence about the overall
quality of its management. The firm can counter
with a “due diligence” defense, which involves
showing that the defendant exercised reasonable
care under the circumstances.69 At least one Ontario
court has treated failure to receive industry certification as failure of the due diligence defense.70
Certification standards have also been incorporated
67

68

69

70

For a description of community participation see R. Nils Olsen, Jr., The
Concentration of Commercial Hazardous Waste Facilities in the Western
New York Community, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 473 (1991).
The appropriateness of preferential treatment for certified firms should not
be presumed, however. At present there appears to be little empirical
evidence that firms in certification programs generally perform better than
uncertified firms. In the American Responsible Care program, in fact, it
appears that participants have reduced their pollution discharges no more
quickly, and possibly more slowly, than non-participants. Andrew King and
Michael Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: the Chemical
Industry’s Responsible Care Program, ACAD. OF MGMT. J. (forthcoming). The authors hypothesize that this may reflect several factors, including the possible attractions of participation as a “smoke screen” for poorly
performing firms and the failure of the program to apply significant sanctions to date. They note that the program is considering taking stronger
action against poor performers and the possibility of implementing a thirdparty verification program to replace the current self-verification program.
They also indicate that increased external scrutiny, whether by government, NGOs, or community members, could stimulate significant improvements in the effectiveness of the program.
Kernaghan Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, in R. Gibson, ed.,
VOLUNTARY
INITIATIVES: THE NEW POLITICS OF CORPORATE GREENING, at 3250 (1999) at 33.
R. v. Domtar, O.J. No. 3415 (Ont.C.J., Gen. Div.) (1993), as cited in
Webb, id.
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into law through remedies. In another Canadian
case involving a violation of air pollution standards
the defendant proposed, and the judge accepted, a
remedy requiring the defendant to achieve ISO
14001 certification. Of course, such certification
was not a requirement of the regulations involved,
but was incorporated through the equitable powers
of the judge to impose an appropriate remedy.71
Finally, it should also be noted that international
environmental law may become an important
source of indirect incorporation of private standards. Discussions about how to implement the
Kyoto Protocol for the reduction of greenhouse
gasses, for example, include the possibility of using
FSC forest certification to verify the maintenance of
carbon retention “sinks,”72 as well as using ISO
14000 management systems to achieve reductions
in of greenhouse gas emissions.73 What role such
mechanisms will in fact play remains open at present, but their proponents are actively promoting
them as important tools for attacking global climate
change.
In all of the above ways, certification programs can
be incorporated implicitly into legal systems without going through formal legislative or rulemaking
processes. They effectively change the definition of
proper behavior and increase the rewards for compliance with certification standards and the penalties for non-compliance. Given the paucity of empirical research in the area, it is unclear how often
they are doing so. Yet it is clear that we need to
carefully survey such indirect processes if we are to
understand the incorporation of private initiatives in
law.

e) Indirect adoption through “non-environmental”
laws
Environmental certification standards can also be
incorporated into legal systems through nominally
non-environmental laws. This section lists some key
areas where this is likely to happen.

i)Tort Law
Tort law sets standards for liability between parties
who have not dealt with potential liability issues by
contractual or other means. It usually applies to

“accidents,” often but not always between strangers.
In general, American tort law requires parties who
fail to follow standards of “reasonable care” to
compensate those who are foreseeably injured as a
result. Certification standards can be expected to
infuse several different areas of tort law.
(1) Toxic torts
The most obvious arena for potential incorporation
is that of toxic torts, which involves liability for
damage resulting from exposure to toxic environmental agents. The agents are usually chemicals,
but can be biological organisms as well.74 Certification standards are most likely to apply to the
question of what constitutes reasonable care. Both
substantive and management system standards have
the potential for raising requirements. Consider the
example of a firm that releases a toxic agent into a
community and claims non-liability on grounds that
its practices conformed to government regulations75
and industry standards. Plaintiffs could argue that
the firm’s lack of an ISO 14001 management system constituted a failure to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances. Such an argument would
be difficult for a defendant to counter, especially in
light of the fact that a harmful release occurred.
Often the most difficult elements to prove in toxic
tort suits are injury and causation. Environmental
certification systems have the potential to aid plaintiffs in these areas too, since they may require firms
to gather and maintain data on a broad array of
environmental effects. These data would probably
be subject to discovery by plaintiffs in a law suit in
many jurisdictions, and could help show chains of
causation and injury. Although some states have
enacted statutes to protect companies from compulsory disclosure of information generated in preparing voluntary environmental audits, such as would
be done for ISO 14001 certification, many states
and the federal government have not enacted such
statutes.76
(2) Negligence
Certification standards might also change liability
standards for run-of-the-mill, non-toxic accidents.
Consider the example of an auto accident triggered
74

71

72

73

R. v. Prospec Chemicals Ltd., A.J. No. 174 Alta. Prov. Ct. (Jan. 25, 1996).
As cited in Webb, id. The judge required the defendant to post a bond of
$40,000 subject to forfeiture if the company failed to comply with the certification order.
Forest Stewardship Council, “Background Paper for FSC and Carbon
Certification Workshop,” FSC Website:
http://www.fscoax.org/html/assembly_general/carbon_bkgd.htm
ISO Technical Committee 207 Climate Change Task Force, “Application
of the ISO 140000 Series of Standards to the Issue of Global Climate
Change, Draft Third Interim Report, June 2000 (Document Reference:
ISO TC 207 CCTF N29R3).

75

76

See e.g., Gene J. Heady, Stuck Inside These Four Walls: Recognition of
Sick Building Syndrome Has Laid the Foundation to Raise Toxic Tort
Litigation to New Heights,” 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1041, 1053 (1995).
This is sometimes called the “regulatory compliance” defense. On the
whole, American courts have tended not to defer to regulatory standards
in tort cases. They have been criticized for this tendency in recent years,
and doctrine in the area may be undergoing some change. See generally,
Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L. J.
(2000) (forthcoming).
Donald A. Carr & William L. Thomas, Devising a Compliance Strategy
Under the ISO 14000 International Environmental Management Standards, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 191-205 (1997).
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by road damage resulting from slumping earth
where a firm harvested timber on steep slopes.
Although government regulations might permit it,
and other firms might engage in similar harvesting,
prohibition by a program such as that of the FSC
could be taken as persuasive evidence of failure to
exercise due care.77 Again note that the firm could
be liable whether it was certified or not. Thus law
would operate to extend “voluntary” standards to
non-participants.
(3) Nuisance
General standards for land use in Anglo-American
law are defined through the law of nuisance, which
generally prohibits uses of land which “substantially” and “unreasonably” interfere with the use
and enjoyment of land by others.78 Just what is
unreasonable is hard to define, and depends on
many factors (common practices in the area, priority in time, costs and benefits of the use, etc.). It is
possible to anticipate, however, that in some instances certification standards, particularly substantive ones, could be called upon to define land uses
as unreasonable. To offer a forestry example again,
stream pollution which results from a clear cut
larger than would be allowed by a certification
system and which substantially affects the water
quality of a downstream owner could potentially be
cited as unreasonable, and enjoined by a court. The
same might be true of air pollution suffered by
downwind residents from a non-certified chemical
plant.
(4) Misrepresentation
American tort law has long provided a cause of
action to anyone physically injured as a result of
reasonable reliance on a fraudulent misrepresentation made by one who is in the business of selling a
product.79 The common law requirement of physical
harm is likely to limit the number of plaintiffs who
can bring general common law actions involving
certification programs,80 but it is conceivable that
some physical harm might result from misrepre77

78
79
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Though the issue is not central to this article, note that the converse is
also possible. Someone injured by a product or enterprise that met a privately set standard could sue the standard setting organization in tort.
Although American courts tradtionally eschew such suits, some important
ones have been successful. See Shoaf, supra note 38 at 38 for an overview. See also Jeffrey Q. Smith, Jeanne P. Bolger and Amy Marasco,
Products Liability Claims Against Voluntary Standards Developers -- An
Update on Recent Developments, American National Standards Institute
Website: http://web.ansi.org/public/library/guides/prod_liability.html.
See generally, Prosser and Keeton, LAW OF TORTS (5th Ed, 1984).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
Section 42B (1998) (“one engaged in the business of selling or otherwise
distributing products who, in connection with the sale of a product, makes
a fraudulent, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation of a material fact
concerning the product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the misrepresentation.”)
Id, Section 21.
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sentation of fact such as certification status and give
rise to suits outside of the negligence framework.81
In any case, related statutory provisions regarding
misrepresentation clearly provide actions for economic harm. The most important is a broadly
worded provision of the federal “Lanham Act,”
creating general liability for commercial misrepresentation of goods or services to either competitors
or others who are damaged.82 It seems clear that this
provision could be used in suits against firms said to
be misrepresenting their certification status. It is
even possible that it might be used against firms
who claim to be managing their forests sustainably,
but are not certified. Such suits could conceivably
be brought by competitors who are certified, and
who claim that their competitors are falsely implying that they are as well.83 Suits under this provision
will certainly be worth watching! In addition, the
Federal Trade Commission and various state attorneys general have the authority to brings suits
against companies for commercial misrepresentation, and have often done so.84

ii)Property Law
American property law allows land owners to make
environmental management commitments that will
continue to be binding even if the land comes under
new ownership. One of the most important forms is
the “conservation easement,” through which an
owner, while retaining possession of the land and
the right to use it in many ways, can make specific
commitments to another party regarding how the
land will be used.85 That party, which ordinarily
81

82
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There have certainly been suits for misrepresentation of human rights
records. One brought against clothing manufacturers operating in Saipan,
for example, contributed to a fairly far reaching settlement monitored by
an American not-for-profit organization. Monitoring Program: A Plan for
Implementing Settlement on Apparel Production in Saipan
http://www.globalexchange.org/economy/corporations/saipan/monitoring.h
tml
Originally passed in 1946, the Lanham Act’s false advertising provision
was amended in 1988 to read as follows: “Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial
activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.” 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1)
(1994).
For examples of the many kinds of suits that have been brought by
competitors under the Lanham Act, see Jean Wegman Burns, Confused
Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 29 B.U.L.REV.
807(1999).
See Lee Goldman, The World’s Best Article on Competitor Suits for False
Advertising, 45 FLA. L.R. 487, 505-506 (1993).
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act defines a conservation easement as “[a] nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing
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must be a governmental or a not-for-profit organization, holds the “benefit” of the easement. It has
the power to determine whether the commitments
are being met, and to take action to enforce them if
they are not. Certification appears to be an excellent
way of enforcing the kinds of conservation easements which allow continued management for forestry, but prohibit overcutting, reductions of biodiversity, and the like. Using certification as an enforcement mechanism would considerably reduce
the burden on benefit holders, and provide a “neutral,” third-party assessment of how well the burdens of the easement are being met. Accordingly, it
seems likely that drafters of conservation easements
will discover the benefits of certification and begin
incorporating them in the agreements.

iii)Tax Law
Tax law could also become an important means of
incorporating certification in the legal system. Conservation easements, for example, are often donated
or sold to conservation organizations for very low
prices. If the price received is less than the reduction in property value resulting from the transfer of
the easement,86 that difference can qualify as a
charitable deduction under federal income tax law87
and may bring additional tax benefits under state
laws. Given the creativity of tax lawyers in arguing
for deductions generally, it seems likely that other
avenues in tax law will be probed in order to improve the financial benefits of certification.

iv)Information Regulation
As the Lanham Act indicates, U.S. law tends to
treat information relatively seriously.88 One very
important statute in the environmental arena is the
“community right to know” law, which requires
users of specified toxic and hazardous chemicals to
file annual reports disclosing names and quantities
of chemicals either stored on site or released into

86

87
88

limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property,
assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space
use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water
quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.” Unif. Conserv. Easement Act, § 1(1)
(1981). The easement document ordinarily defines in much greater detail
which uses will be allowed and which will not. See, e.g., Janet Kiehl and
Thomas Barrett, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK
(1988). The easement is recorded in the file on the property which is
maintained by the central registry in the local jurisdiction where the property is located.
Conservation easements are generally expected to reduce the market
value of property because they transfer some of its development potential
away from the property.
26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (1994)
One possibly important exception is continuing reliance on industry selfregulation in the area of electronic commerce. This area remains very
dynamic, and it is not clear either whether industry self-regulation will
persist or whether it will have a significant influence on other areas.

the air, land, or water.89 Other laws require additional reporting of information on water and air
pollution. Information reported under these statutes
is generally available to the public from state and
federal environmental agencies. Although it can be
poorly coordinated and difficult to analyze, the
value and accessibility of this information are likely
to improve steadily as agencies implement modern,
internet-oriented information systems. Moreover, if
certification programs deliver on their promise to
improve information production, management, and
analysis in firms, those improvements may be reflected over time in the rules governing public disclosure requirements. Finally, public reporting laws
are likely to be important aids to public and private
monitoring of the implementation of environmental
certification programs in firms. By creating external
capacity to compare certified firms to each other
and to uncertified firms, it may also provide extra
leverage for those pushing firms to become certified
and certification programs to become stringent.90

v)Financial Regulation
U.S. financial regulation may be even more reliant
on information disclosure than environmental
regulation. Because the economic prospects of firms
can be heavily affected by their environmental
performance, financial regulation also has considerable potential to reinforce certification standards.
Corporate disclosures are regulated both by detailed
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations, and by the general “anti-fraud” provisions
of the securities laws, as well as by state laws. At
present, the formal requirements of SEC rules are
not particularly demanding regarding environmental
issues. They tend to focus on potential legal liabilities of firms, and accord firms considerable discretion in deciding what to report.91 However, certified
firms are free to report their status, and many will
do so. Such information is valuable both to general
analysts assessing the likely profitability of firms
and to green consumers seeking to distinguish between investment options based on environmental
performance. SEC regulations mandate “generally
accepted accounting principles,” which are largely
established by the profession itself through its own
89
90

91

42 U.S.C. § § 11022 and 11023.
The King and Lennox research on the American Responsible Care
program indicates to potential power of public information reporting in
assessing the effectiveness of certification programs. Andrew King and
Michael Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical
Industry's Responsible Care Program, ACAD. OF MGNT. J. (forthcoming).
Copy on file with author.
See generally, John W. Bagby, Paula C. Murray, and Eric T. Andrews, So
How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate Liability and Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 225 (1995).
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private standards setting process.92 While the long
term existence and relative success of this division
of responsibility suggests the potential of environmental certification programs, the immediately
relevant point is that it provides a potential mechanism for incorporating certification status into financial reporting. Whether and how this will happen remains to be seen. An important trend, however, is that financial reporting standards relating to
environmental performance are currently subject to
increased attention and debate in the U.S.93 The
critique that reporting standards are overly conservative regarding environmental performance appears to be gaining ground. To the extent that it
prevails, both formally and informally, financial
reporting may become an increasingly important
channel for legal incorporation of environmental
certification in the future.

vi)Trade Law
The U.S. is signatory to a number of international
trade treaties, including the series of agreements
referred to as the General Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (GATT). The GATT requires,
among other things, that “where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them . . . as a basis for technical
regulations.”94 While this provision pushes governments to formally incorporate international standards in their positive laws, the GATT is also likely
to have broader informal incorporation effects over
time. By presumptively privileging international
standards, the GATT may give private international
environmental standard setting programs implicit
legal standing regardless of whether their standards
formally incorporated in state laws. This is especially so because the World Trade Organization, the
GATT’s primary trade regulation body, has found it
extremely difficult to promulgate rules to date.95
This situation virtually invites private international
standard setting bodies to fill the vacuum as quickly
as possible.
92

93

94

95

The standard setting process is organized through the Financial Standards Accounting Board, which also has an Emerging Issues Task Force
that deals with problems such as those in the changeable field of environmental accounting and reporting. Id at 306-7.
Id. See also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197
(1999).
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, Basic Documents of International Economic Law, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 141 (Commerce Clearing House,
1994).
See, e.g., Marco Bronkers, Better Rules for a New Millennium: A Warning
Against Undemocratic Developments in the WTO, 2 J. INT. BUS. L. 547
(1999).
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f) Forbearance
What does it mean when state legal systems take no
direct action regarding private certification systems? Inaction is to be expected when certification
systems are new and government has little experience with them. After certification programs become better understood, however, government
forbearance may begin to take on meaning. Most
likely it will be taken to indicate tacit approval. It
could even be seen as an implicit delegation of
regulatory authority to the program. In practice, of
course, it might simply be the case that legislatures
and agencies see more pressing needs for scarce
government resources in other areas. Intentionally
or not, however, government forbearance could
grow into a form of tacit delegation over time,
making it increasingly unlikely that government
will significantly expand its regulatory presence in
the areas. Assuming there remains a societal expectation that some program is necessary, government forbearance may thus contribute to the longterm strengthening of environmental certification
programs. Institutionally oriented scholars would
see them as having been incorporated into the social
control system of which the formal legal system
forms a part. That would have been accomplished
with the assistance of the legal system by its essentially doing nothing!

3 Legal Control of Certification Systems
Legal systems can shape certification systems, and
not merely incorporate them. Indeed, many of the
legal incorporation mechanisms described above
may affect the content and practice of certification
as well. Certification systems are likely to be
shaped in part with an eye to how legal systems
may react.

a) Informal Steering
While government forbearance may be seen as a
tacit form of approval or delegation, it can also be a
tactical strategy for “steering” the development of
certification programs. Regulatory officials and
certification officials are likely to observe each
other’s behavior. Government agencies are likely to
be able to affect the substance and implementation
of certification programs to some extent simply by
how they signal they “might” react to them. Of
course, this is simply the mirror image of certification programs trying to steer government policy, but
it is important to note the capacity of government to
affect programs by doing nothing yet giving signals
about what it might do.
Governments might also be able to steer certification programs by providing them with technical
expertise, by actively participating in them, or by
supporting research on their performance, all of
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which the U.S. is doing.96 In particular, they could
gather and support the analysis of data regarding the
relative performance of certification programs and
firms within them. Governments can thereby simultaneously hedge their policy bets and enhance
the transparency of certification programs. By thus
facilitating increased production and dissemination
of information, they may also increase the learning
capacity of the regulatory system as a whole.

b) Direct Regulation
Should informal steering not suffice, governments
always have the option of regulating certification
programs.97 They might do this in a number of
ways. First, they could redefine the substantive
management standards which must be met by firms
seeking to be certified.98 Of course such an action
would pose a dilemma for certification programs,
particularly global ones, and they would have to
decide whether to remain in business in the jurisdiction, try to get the law changed, ignore it, etc.
Second, governments could impose rules governing
the procedures followed by certification programs -standard setting processes, certification processes,
enforcement processes, etc. They might, for example, require more or different kinds of public participation in certification proceedings.99 They might
require the disclosure of information that designers
of certification processes planned not to disclose.
Given the discretion vested in certifiers by many
private certification schemes, governments might
also decide to define minimum qualifications for
certifiers. In fact, governments could go so far as
develop public certification standards for private
certification programs! Note that the Connecticut
law discussed above carries the seeds of such possibilities within it.
There are many more possibilities. Two points
should be kept in mind. First, certification programs

perform public functions, functions which are most
often carried out by government agencies under the
types of rules listed above. Second, such forms of
regulation have been imposed on other private actors with public responsibilities, such as medical
professionals,100 accountants,101 lawyers, and so on.
There is no reason to assume that environmental
professionals will enjoy permanent immunity.

c) Inhibition of Certification Systems
i) National Trade Regulation
Where industrial firms cooperate to set standards
governing themselves, potentially raising prices for
their products or inhibiting entry into their industry,
national fair trade laws, such as the U.S. anti-trust
laws, are always likely to be an issue. They have
received considerable attention in development of
certification programs to date. Often this attention
has been private, with certification organizations
seeking confidential advice from law firms and
conducting confidential consultations with national
trade authorities.102 Other times it has been public,
sometimes when certification programs explain why
they cannot be more ambitious,103 and sometimes
when they instruct participants on how to avoid
anit-trust problems.104 As noted in Section 2, national trade laws can impose some constraints, but
do not seem to be a major obstacle to certification
programs at this time.105

ii) International Trade Regulation
The past few years have seen a major expansion in
the power of the international trading institutions,
which have used a series of international treaties to
impose increasingly significant constraints on domestic regulatory programs. The World Trade Organization is currently responsible for implementing
global trading policy by interpreting and applying
100The

96

97

98

99

Shoaf, supra note 38. See also General Accounting Office, “Certification
Requirements: New Guidance Should Encourage Transparency in Agency
Decision Making,” Report to the Chairman, Committee on Small Business,
House of Representatives, GAO/GCD-99-179 (September, 1999).
The federal government, for example, has passed a statutory framework
authorizing the U.S. Department of Agriculture to regulate the certification
of organic foods. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA), 7 U.S.C.
§6501 (2000). The department has yet to promulgate final standards under the Act, so many states have enacted their own programs. J. Howard
Beales III, Modification and Consumer Information: Modern Biotechnology
and the Regulation of Information, 55 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 105, 117
(2000). See e.g. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. 5h-19.004 (2000); IOWA
AMIN. CODE 21-47.1(190C) (2000).
It should also be noted that the standards for certified firms could continue
to be different from those for non-certified firms.
Indeed, the American anti-trust laws already do so to some degree, by
favoring standard setting processes that are open, balanced, and transparent. See generally, David A. Swankin, How Due Process in the Development of Voluntary Consensus Standards Can Reduce the Risk of Antitrust Liability, Prepared for the U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Inst. Of
Standards and Tech., NIST-GCR-90-571 (1990); Shoaf, supra note 38.

American health care system, for example, involves a very complicated mix of non-governmental regulation by the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Hospitals and detailed regulation of the behavior health
care professionals and specific aspects of health care provision. See, e.g.,
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 Bos. C.
L. R., 835 (1983) and Steve P. Calandrillo, Physician-Assisted Suicide
Under Managed Care , 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 72 (1998).
101 See, e.g., Daniel L. Goelzer and Susan Ferris Wyderko, Rule 2(E):
Securities and Exchange Commission Discipline of Professionals, 85 NW.
U. L. REV. 652 (1991).
102 E.g., Webb, supra note 69.
103 Meidinger, Private Environmental Regulation supra note 3 (describing the
American Forest & Paper Association’s decision to employ a voluntary
logger training program, rather than a requirement that all suppliers be
trained in sustainable forestry methods).
104 E.g., Swankin, supra note 99.
105 Their primary effects have been on so-called “buyers groups,” which are
groups of wholesalers and retailer who jointly commit to buy only certified
products. These groups have evidently been constrained in various ways
by trade laws, but no published information has been found that explains
how.
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
recent important amendments on “technical barriers
to trade” (TBTs).106 As noted in Section 2, the
GATT system is likely to be an importation mechanism for legal incorporation of certification systems. It can also pose some problems, however. The
main issue facing private certification systems is
whether they might be classified by the WTO as
TBTs on grounds that they seek to differentiate
among similar products based on how they were
produced. Since the primary targets of the treaties
are states, some observers question whether private
certification organizations should be covered at all.
The TBT amendments do apply to “recognized
bodies,” however, a term not defined in the
treaty.107 Kernaghan Webb concludes that an organization like the ISO, with its designated national
standards bodies, should be viewed as a recognized
body, but that groups like the Forest Stewardship
Council should not. This makes some sense, but is
also vulnerable based on the analysis of the paper
thus far. “Recognition” could be given either a
broad or a narrow interpretation. On the broad side,
even forbearance from regulating based on an assessment that a certification program is performing
acceptably could be viewed as recognition. On the
narrow side, the WTO could conclude that unless a
state explicitly delegates authority to regulate in a
field to a certification program, it is not a recognized program. This is another area that will bear
watching. The effects of the WTO on domestic
legal incorporation of certification programs could
be quite significant in years to come. And of course,
if the WTO is treated as a form of legal system even
though it is not a nation state, we must ask the
question to what degree it incorporates certification
programs.

4 Conclusions
a) Patterns of Legal Incorporation
Certification programs are natural targets for legal
incorporation because they have elements of formality, continuity, and institutionalization that
other, ostensibly one-shot industry initiatives may
not have, and also because they reduce the costs of
deliberation for legal bodies. Although the incorporation of certification programs into U.S. law is
only beginning to unfold, the analysis in Sections 2
and 3 suggests that it is occurring, mostly through
indirect legal processes. Yet the process of legal
106
107

GATT, supra note 94.
Annex I of the TBT Amendments defines “standard” as a “document
approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory.” GATT,
supra note 94.
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incorporation is very difficult to monitor. On the
one hand, it can occur in so many small steps simultaneously in so many avenues that it is very
difficult to trace. It can go forward almost unnoticed. On the other hand, there is a tension between
the quasi-legal analysis performed above and quantitative analysis. The facts that the forms of incorporation described above can occur, and are occurring,
do not necessarily demonstrate that a widespread
change is taking place. They indicate that larger
changes may be occurring, though, and that it is
appropriate to inquire further.

b) Implications
Exactly how to inquire further is not clear. The
problem is not only how to measure change, but
also what change to measure. One of the primary
reasons legal incorporation of certification is interesting is that it may signal larger shifts in social
governance structures. The challenge is to grasp the
dimensions of the change that are likely to most
important. To date, most analysis has focused on
questions such as whether private environmental
programs yield environmental performance better
than would have occurred otherwise, and whether
they improve cost-effectiveness. Although the answers vary with specific cases, they seem to incline
toward a cautious “yes.”108 Provided certain safeguards are present, such as transparency and watchdog groups with the ability to monitor activities,
environmental and efficiency gains can be
achieved.109 And of course, the fact that these gains
are possible may be what impels the establishment
of certification systems and other private initiatives
in the first place.
Yet, other dimensions of change may be equally or
more important. For example, the proliferation and
institutionalization of certification systems may
signal a general shift in political power from some
actors to others. Who exactly who is gaining and
losing power? Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, who have
studied the growth of private authority in a number
of sectors, conclude that traditional nation states are
clearly losing ground, while corporate industrial
interests are gaining.110 They argue that this shift is
bringing a diminution of public participation and
accountability.111 In their even more expansive
study, Braithwaite and Drahos agree that many
E.g., Carlo Carraro and Francois Leveque, eds., VOLUNTARY
APPROACHES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1999). See also the papers collected at the website on the Second CAVA Workshop on the Efficiency of Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Policy,
http://www.akf.dk/cava/wp.htm.
109 Carraro and Leveque, id at 10.
110 A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, eds., PRIVATE
AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1999) at 369-70.
111 Id.
108
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states are losing ground to corporations and selfregulatory organizations in the emerging global
regulatory system.112 They see the system as fluid
and highly variable, however, depending on the
particular area of regulation and problem. Actors
pursue their agendas in significant part by hashing
out guiding principles, and even relatively smallscale players encounter a surprising number of
strategic opportunities to affect the system. Nonetheless, the overall pattern is one of increasing control by large, powerful actors, working as often
through private governance processes as through
state ones.
The growth of a global regulatory system relying
heavily on private regulation also raises important
questions about the nature of political legitimacy,
and whether it might be changing. Received social
theory holds that to survive governance systems
must establish significant claims to legitimacy with
the public. How do private environmental regulatory systems do this? One possibility, of course, is
that people simply do not understand how they
work or how important they are. While this is true
of some systems, which pretend to seek transparency while thwarting it in practice, it is not true of
all of them. Moreover, the ones reviewed in the
research underlying this paper seem to be moving
on the whole toward increased transparency. Thus,
it seems important to ask whether a new form of
legitimacy may be emerging, one that is not based
on traditional political processes managed by the
state. If so, perhaps it is based on the certification
systems’ peculiar combination of commitments to
laudable but diffuse goals, high expertise, selective
stakeholder participation, and independence from
government. Plausible or not, this kind of hypothesis has received only the most preliminary exploration to date. If private environmental certification
systems flourish, such questions will have to be
addressed.113
Fourth, as suggested above, voluntary agreements,
certification programs, and legal incorporation may
and perhaps should be seen in connection to larger
developments in society. There has been a certain
amount of work attempting to make such linkages
to conventional legal institutions. Some approaches
focus more on discursive processes in society,114
John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION
(2000). They see the U.S. and the European Union, however, as still the
most powerful actors in the global regulatory system.
113 It should also be noted that the question of legitimacy plagues both
private certification systems and supra-national governmental entities,
such as the WTO and the EU, which also stand in some tension with nation states. See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the
Administrative Character of Supranationalism: the Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (1999).
114 E.g., Teubner, supra note 13.
112

while others focus on organizational structures and
patterns of relationships. 115 The next step is to link
the study of the incorporation of private regulatory
systems to those constructs.
Finally, it may be time to revisit the meaning of
“law” and “legal system.” As the discussion of
international trade law suggested, the role of the
nation-state and state-based law is becoming increasingly problematical. It is being challenged
from one side by the growth of a global trading
system with an accompanying legal system, and
from the other by the growth of private, often global
regulatory mechanisms such as the certification
systems. Yet the two supposedly defining characteristics of certification systems, their privateness
and their voluntariness, are highly contingent. They
are under serious threat as a result of the linkages of
certification systems to national and transnational
legal systems. They could turn into their opposites
before we really notice it. If so, perhaps they were
not what they seemed.
Appendix A. Examples of Forest Stewardship
Council Principles and Standards.
The Forest Stewardship Principles and Criteria, applicable around the world, are as follows:
Forest management shall respect all applicable laws of
the country in which they occur, and international treaties
and agreements to which the country is a signatory, and
comply with all FSC Principles and Criteria.
1. Long-term tenure and use rights to the land and
forest resources shall be clearly defined, documented
and legally established.
2. The legal and customary rights of indigenous peoples to own, use and manage their lands, territories,
and resources shall be recognized and respected.
3. Forest management operations shall maintain or
enhance the long-term social and economic wellbeing of forest workers and local communities.
4. Forest management operations shall encourage the
efficient use of the forest's multiple products and
services to ensure economic viability and a wide
range of environmental and social benefits.
5. Forest management shall conserve biological diversity and its associated values, water resources, soils,
and unique and fragile ecosystems and landscapes,
and, by so doing, maintain the ecological functions
and the integrity of the forest.
6. A management plan -- appropriate to the scale and
intensity of the operations -- shall be written, implemented, and kept up to date. The long term objectives
115

E.g., David M. Trubek, Yves Dezalay, Ruth Buchanan, and John R.
Davis, Global Restructuring and The Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE
W. RES. 407 (1994) (emerging systemic relationships, particularly the
growth of a global trading order, may drive changes in both private and
public legal orders).
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of management, and the means of achieving them,
shall be clearly stated.
7. Monitoring shall be conducted -- appropriate to the
scale and intensity of forest management -- to assess
the condition of the forest, yields of forest products,
chain of custody, management activities and their social and environmental impacts.
8. Management activities in high conservation value
forests shall maintain or enhance the attributes which
define such forests. Decisions regarding high conservation value forests shall always be considered in the
context of a precautionary approach.
9. Plantations shall be planned and managed in accordance with Principles and Criteria 1 - 9, and Principle
10 and its Criteria. While plantations can provide an
array of social and economic benefits, and can contribute to satisfying the world's needs for forest products, they should complement the management of,
reduce pressures on, and promote the restoration and
conservation of natural forests.
Exemplifying the countless standards and indicators
implementing the principles and criteria are those of the
Canadian Maritime Region regarding biodiversity, which
were promulgated as a regional application of Principle 6
above:
6.2 * Safeguards shall exist which protect rare, threatened, and endangered species and their habitats (e.g.
nesting and feeding areas). Conservation zones and
protection areas, appropriate to the scale and intensity
of forest management and the uniqueness of the affected resources, shall be established. Inappropriate
hunting, fishing, trapping and collecting shall be controlled.

Forest workers are aware of known occurrences of
such species and are following the management plan
with respect to protecting such species and their
habitat.
Management staff is aware of those species that may
occur locally.
6.2.2 * Old growth stands must not be harvested.
Indicators:
Inventories are carried out to identify old growth stands
(appropriate to the scale and intensity of the operation).
Old growth stands are identified on management plan
maps.
No evidence of harvesting old growth stands exists.
Management and forest workers are aware of the characteristics of old growth stands.
6.2.3 Areas with unusually high native species or ecosystem diversity must be identified, and protected or
managed in such a way as to ensure that the diversity
is not lost.
Indicators:
Management has identified areas with unusually high
native species or ecosystem diversity using the latest
regional methodolgy, formulae, and/or techniques
(e.g. those used by WWF, Greater Fundy Ecosystem
Research Group or New Brunswick Nature Trust).
Such areas are identified on management plan maps.
Management plans detail measures to ensure the diversity
of such sites is not lost.
Forest workers are following the management plan measures to ensure the diversity of such sites is not lost.

6.2.1 * Threatened and endangered species (listed by
provincial and federal endangered species legislation)
and their habitat must be protected or managed in accordance with approved recovery plans. Where recovery plans are not yet approved, disturbance of
known occurrences of such species is to be avoided
and a cautionary approach taken to protect their
habitat. Forest owner/manager activities must ensure
that species that are rare, vulnerable or under investigation by COSEWIC, or their provincial equivalents
as designated by recognized authorities (e.g. academic experts, provincial or national museums or
COSEWIC) are not further threatened by timber or
non-timber activities.
Indicators:

Appendix B. The ISO Environmental Management
System Standard’s environmental policy provision.
4.2 Environmental Policy

Areas are inventoried for such species before harvesting,
stand improvement or road-building activities are carried out (appropriate to the scale and intensity of the
operation).

d)

Protection of such species is addressed in the management plan.

f)

Known occurrences of such species and their habitat are
not disturbed.
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Top management shall define the organization’s environmental policy and ensure that it
a)
b)
c)

e)

116

is appropriate to the nature, scale and environmental impacts of its activities, products or services;
includes a commitment to continual improvement
and prevention of pollution;
includes a commitment to comply with relevant
environmental legislation and regulations, and with
other requirements to which the organization subscribes;
provides the framework for setting and reviewing
environmental objectives and targets;
is documented, implemented and maintained and
communicated to all employees;
is available to the public.116

ISO, International Standard 14001, Environmental management systems
-- Specification with guidance for use. § 4.2.

